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Abstract: Many foreign firms tend to follow the market-seeking mandate in China. However 
this orientation alone does not guarantee superior performance. From the perspectives of 
strategic fit and institutional theory, this research seeks to reveal several conditions under 
which market-seeking MNEs can achieve superior performance in China. We identify three 
performance contributors to marketing seeking FDI: the host country’s favorable formal 
institutions towards FDI, the subsidiaries’ operational experience and absorptive capacity in 
the host country, and the ownership structure of the subsidiary. Using data of 5,080 foreign 
invested subsidiaries in 2003-2010, our findings support the hypotheses that market-seeking 
orientation becomes more profitable for foreign subsidiaries in China when (1) the host 
country provides a more favorable institutional framework towards FDI; (2) the subsidiary 
has a longer history of FDI operation in the host country that leads to stronger absorptive 
capacity; and (3) the subsidiary is organized in a wholly owned manner. 
 
Key words: FDI motivation, performance, institutions, WOS, market seeking, experience, 
China 
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Market Seeking Orientation and Performance in China: The Impact of Institutional 
Environment, Subsidiary Ownership Structure and Experience 
 
1. Introduction 
International firms expanding into foreign countries can focus on either the local market, 
seeking benefits from market growth by selling locally, or export markets, pursuing benefits 
from sales outside the host country (Brouthers et al. 2008; Luo 2002; Nachum and Zaheer 
2005). In the literature, the former is termed as market seeking, versus the latter as resource 
seeking (Luo 2003; Luo and Park 2001; Nachum and Zaheer 2005; Wadhwa and Sudhakara 
2011); market seeking orientation is used to describe a foreign firm’s strategic intention to 
sell locally as the share of domestic sale in total sales of the firm (Pan and Chi 1999; Song 
2002). Market seeking is often the primary strategy of foreign direct investment (FDI) in less 
developed economies to grab local market opportunity and growth (Luo 2001; Luo and Park 
2001). China has become one of the biggest markets for both raw materials and manufactured 
products/services, such as crude oil, iron ore, steel and motor vehicles, etc. MNEs not only 
export to but also emphasize making FDI in fast-growing markets such as China with the aim 
of seizing local sales opportunities (Dunning 2000; 2009). Many companies that initially 
came for low labor costs now want to stay because China has become a huge market in its 
own right, and the production cost has dramatically increased (The Economist 2013). As 
early as 1996, approximately 80% of FDI in China was pursuing market seeking (Luo and 
Park 2001). 
Past market seeking research sees different routes of inquiry. Some investigate the 
determinants to the local responsiveness of subsidiaries, including environmental factors, and 
firm network resources (Luo 2001). Chen, Griffith and Hu (2006) find that liability of 
foreignness increases the likelihood of adopting market-seeking strategies. Some use market 
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seeking MNEs as the general research context while exploring the performance drivers, such 
as environment uncertainty-offsetting competitive strategy (Luo and Park 2001), 
diversification and majority ownership (Zhao and Luo 2002), parent-subsidiary links (Luo 
2003), and resource commitment (Luo 2003). Brouthers, Gao and McNicol (2008) suggest 
that market attractiveness can mitigates negative impact of corruption on market-seeking FDI. 
Some research reveals that market seeking firms use less joint ventures for new venture 
formation (Gil et al. 2006). Lastly, market seeking FDI will impact local economy by creating 
more jobs among linked partners (Hansen et al. 2009). Table 1 presents a summary of recent 
market seeking research.  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Despite these research efforts, our knowledge of how market-seeking orientation enhances 
subsidiary performance remains limited (Pan and Chi 1999). The existing studies suffer from 
several limitations. First, they simply focus on firm resources/capabilities or competitive 
strategies (e.g., Luo 2003; Luo and Park 2001; Zhao and Luo 2002) without considering 
important influence by the host country’s institutional forces, and the interaction between 
these forces and the firm’s strategy and capabilities. Recent development in institutional 
theory suggests that the institutional forces drive international strategy and performance 
(Peng et al. 2008). Moreover, the institutions are evolving, and the impact on businesses is 
also changing. Ignoring the host country’s dynamic institutions can risk an MNE’s legitimacy, 
deepening its liability of foreignness, and dampening subsidiary performance (Xu et al. 
2004).  
Second, these studies do not fully consider the strategic fit of this strategy and other external 
and internal factors, assuming that market seeking is equally effective in different conditions 
(Gil et al. 2006). The strategic fit perspective asserts an important co-alignment between the 
strategy, the environment and organization structure, where the strategy is organized and 
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implemented with the aim of enhancing performance (Olson et al. 2005; Venkatraman 1989; 
Venkatraman and Camillus 1984; Xu et al. 2006b). For example, when fulfilling FDI, wholly 
owned subsidiaries (WOSs) and joint ventures (JVs) are different along a range of attributes 
(Brouthers et al. 2008); Making FDI, an MNE needs to understand that the use of a different 
subsidiary structure can make market seeking more or less effective (Venkatraman and 
Camillus 1984).  
We overcome these limitations and address the focal question by using lenses of the strategic 
fit paradigm (Venkatraman 1989; Venkatraman and Camillus 1984) and the institutional 
theory (North 1990; Oliver 1991; Peng et al. 2008; Venkatraman and Prescott 1990). 
Following Zajac et al.’s (2000) argument that strategic fit is affected by multiple 
environmental and organizational contingencies, we combine MNEs’ market-seeking strategy 
with several critical factors, including the host country’s institutional forces, subsidiary 
experience and operating ownership structure, all of which can influence the strategic fit in an 
attempt to explain FDI performance (Brouthers and Hennart 2007; Delios and Beamish 2001; 
Luo 2001; Peng et al. 2008). These specific environmental and organizational factors provide 
unique time- and organization-specific predictions regarding the strategic fit in FDI (Murray 
et al. 2009; Zajac et al. 2000). 
This research makes three important contributions to the literature. First, with the 
combination of institutional thinking and strategic fit perspective, we depart from the existing 
FDI market seeking literature which merely emphases firm resources or competitive 
orientation (e.g., Luo 2003; Luo and Park 2001) by advocating a comprehensive and 
integrative approach that explores the way in which external forces (host country’s FDI 
institutions) and organizational factors (FDI experience and operational ownership structure) 
interact with each other in influencing market-seeking firms’ performance.  
Second, our study addresses an important but not yet fully answered question of how FDI 
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performance can be improved by matching market seeking orientation with multiple factors. 
Drawing on the strategic fit perspective and the strategic response theme of institutional 
theory, we suggest that organizations can react to the institutional challenges by aligning 
operational structure and resources to them in order to develop a strategic fit. The match will 
have significant positive effects on market-seeking subsidiaries’ performance. Despite this 
notion’s appeal and centrality in strategic management, there is limited research targeting the 
extent to which fit for market-seeking MNEs can explain inter-firm performance differences 
in international operations. Our research is one of the few empirical attempts designed 
explicitly to examine the existence, nature, and performance outcomes of fit among 
market-seeking orientation, experience, and the institutional environment and subsidiary 
ownership in which it is implemented. By addressing the effect of strategy match on 
performance, we tackle an important issue: whether fit matters and, if so, the extent to which 
and when it matters. We explore these aspects within the context of MNCs’ marketing 
seeking operations on the basis of its coalignment with institutional environment, subsidiary 
structure and international experience, and the performance consequences. 
Third, this research extends the institutional change perspective (Cantwell et al. 2010; North 
1990; Peng 2003) by considering the time effect of evolving institutions with the aid of a 
sizable longitudinal data set
1
. We develop and test a hypothesis about the evolutionary 
relationship between institution change and market-seeking strategy-performance. This marks 
a novel and significant contribution to this stream of research. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Market seeking orientation 
Market seeking in emerging markets has become more and more attractive, with MNEs 
                                                             
1 We thank a reviewer for helping us strengthen this point. 
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increasingly turning to these as key locations for future growth while developed world 
markets are becoming saturated (London and Hart 2004). The size and increasing wealth of 
an economy are key factors that make local markets attractive, because they create 
opportunities for new entrants, as well as higher returns, and allow for specialization, market 
segmentation, and the potential for scale of economies (Brouthers et al. 2008). During the last 
four decades, China has enjoyed huge economic development and become a major market for 
a wide range of industrial and consumer products. The country also has a vast potential 
untapped market opportunity. Downstream integration into distribution and marketing 
activities has become a widely practiced strategy for MNEs operating in China (Li 1994). 
These market seekers intend to sell products in the Chinese market to get their share of the 
constantly fast-growing consumer and industrial markets (Brouthers et al. 2008; Luo 2001; 
Luo and Park 2001). As a result, there has been a high percentage of domestic sales to MNEs’ 
total sales volume (Pan and Chi 1999; Song 2002).  
Market-seeking FDI is driven by the reduction of spatial transaction costs that reflect both the 
liberalization of cross-border markets and the changing characteristics of economic activity 
(Dunning 2009). These MNEs enjoy a higher level of downstream vertical integration in an 
attempt to avoid various transaction costs due to the under-developed market-supporting 
frameworks in developing countries on the one hand (Pan and Chi 1999), and to reap benefits 
from pent-up, indigenous demand that has long been stifled by government interventions in 
these markets on the other (Luo and Park 2001).  
Compared with the other FDI strategies such as resource seeking (or export market seeking) 
(Luo 2001), market expansion requires a deeper understanding of local customers (Nachum 
and Zaheer 2005), competition, distribution systems, and the institutional framework that 
constrain how foreign firms and their domestic counterparts engage in satisfying local 
changing demands and needs. Market seeking subsidiaries monitor the market situation and 
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carefully apply product and market innovations developed by headquarters, and accordingly 
transfer mature products and technologies to the host (Luo and Park 2001).They often use 
market penetration and extend the strength of their traditional product- market bases. This 
strategy also requires a high level of local adaptation of MNE operations (Luo 2001; Pan and 
Chi 1999): the management team is often given more autonomy; the firm gives more 
emphasis to the local market, develops necessary business networks, and in the meantime 
capitalizes on its capabilities in R&D, technology, production and marketing. Market seeking 
allows MNEs to extend the life cycle of their primary products and to maximize returns on 
their technological skills when avoiding the market fluctuations outside the host country (Pan 
and Chi 1999).  
Nevertheless, past research does not find that MNEs’ sales in the host country necessarily 
impact profitability (Pan and Chi 1999), which can be explained with the thinking of 
equifinality, a central idea of contingency theory (Murray et al. 2009; Olson et al. 2005). The 
concept of equifinality posits that better performance depends less on a particular strategy, 
and can be realized through a range of different strategies (Venkatraman and Prescott 1990). 
It is the fit between strategy, environment and organizational structure that enhances 
performance (Murray et al. 2009; Olson et al. 2005). Therefore, for a better understanding of 
what make market-seeking FDI a success in an emerging economy such as China, we employ 
the strategic fit perspective (Venkatraman 1989; Venkatraman and Camillus 1984) and the 
institutional theory (North 1990; Oliver 1991; Peng et al. 2008; Venkatraman and Prescott 
1990) as the overarching analytic tools.  
Strategic fit: strategy, institutions, ownership structure, and experience 
Strategic fit is a core concept in the normative model of strategy formulation, and one of the 
most widely shared and enduring assumptions in the strategy literature (Zajac et al. 2000). 
The strategic fit paradigm (Venkatraman and Prescott 1990) posits that the fit (or congruence, 
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consistence, compatibility, or match) between two or more factors, such as organization 
environment, strategy, structure, systems, style, and culture, for example, results in 
organizational performance (Yin and Zajac 2004). Past research notes that different degrees 
of environmental variation require different levels of decision-making comprehensiveness 
and strategic formality to match organizational resources with opportunities and threats in the 
general business environment (Aragón-Correa and Sharma 2003). Firms achieve strategic fits 
with environments and other strategic factors by adopting an appropriate strategy, and 
superior performance is contingent on these strategic fits (Murray et al. 2009; Venkatraman 
and Prescott 1990; Zajac et al. 2000). This is also in line with the contingency theory, which 
argues that superior performance is achieved through the proper alignment of endogenous 
organizational design variables with exogenous context variables (Aragón-Correa and 
Sharma 2003). Prior research has shown how fit between governance structure and strategy 
(i.e., franchising governance and strategic complexity) (Yin and Zajac 2004), and between 
environment and strategy (Murray et al. 2009), increases performance. Despite the 
widespread recognition of the importance of strategic fit, research has yet to address the 
possibility of similar fit issues in international strategies such as market-seeking FDI. 
Building on the strategic fit paradigm, this research goes beyond the usual debates regarding 
the superiority of one strategy over another, and further suggests that performance 
implications of market seeking may be attributable more to the strategic fit than to the market 
seeking orientation itself. In light of this perspective, the strategy needs to be consistent with 
the institutional frameworks in which the firm and strategy are embedded for superior 
performance (Venkatraman and Prescott 1990). The strategy also needs to be congruent with 
the organizational structure to be organized and implemented for better performance (Lukas 
et al. 2001).  
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Institutions are the constraints and incentive systems of a society that structure human 
interactions (North 1990). Organisations have motivation to enhance their legitimacy and 
performance by becoming isomorphic with their institutional environment (Venkatraman and 
Prescott 1990). MNEs co-evolve with the institutional environment to survive and grow 
(Cantwell et al. 2010). Institutions comprise three fundamental pillars of regulative, 
normative and cognitive systems, which elicit related but distinguishable bases of legitimacy 
(Scott, 1995). The regulative pillar encompasses regulative institutions - rules and laws that 
exist to ensure the stability and order of a society (Xu et al. 2004). Institutional constraints 
imposed upon organisations from regulative institutions work mainly through coercive 
forces, directly influencing the behaviours of organisations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), and 
firms’ responses to these pressures based on self-interest (Peng 2003). According to Xu et al. 
(2004), the “strategic response” theme maintains that firms will respond to the institutional 
challenges by deploying resources and formulating strategies accordingly (He et al. 2013; 
Oliver 1991; Peng 2003). For example, while emerging markets remain highly uncertain and 
dynamic (Luo and Park 2001), MNEs competing in these markets can develop resources 
including absorptive capacity proxied by prior related experience and knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990; Petersen et al. 2008; Zahra and George 2002). MNEs also adjust strategic 
choices to be congruent to the institutions during the time of fundamental and comprehensive 
institutional transitions (Peng 2003). Recently researchers have begun to explore the effect of 
institutional pressure on entry mode selection (Estrin et al. 2009), export channel selection 
(He et al. 2013), ownership choices (Yiu and Makino 2002) and expatriate strategies (Xu et 
al. 2004). In this study, we examine the impact of regulative institutions on MNEs’ choice of 
FDI market orientation in China. In accordance with the institutional theory, we suggest that 
an MNE’s FDI motivation, which is compatible to the host country’s FDI policy, will provide 
better performance.  
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The strategic fit paradigm shows two types of fit that boost organizational performance: the 
fit between strategy and external environment, and the fit between strategy and organizational 
structure (e.g., Lukas et al. 2001; Yin and Zajac 2004). First, organizations that are able to 
align their strategies with their environments to achieve strategic fit are likely to achieve 
higher performance (Lukas et al. 2001; Venkatraman and Prescott 1990). This contention is 
consistent with that of the strategic response theme of institutional theory (Peng 2003). 
MNEs’ strategic fit with the institutional challenge in the host country is that they align the 
strategic resources deployment to the specific requirements of the institutional context, and 
such a fit helps to improve FDI performance (Venkatraman and Prescott 1990). 
Second, firms that are able to align their strategy with internal factors, such as experience and 
organizational structure, are likely to show superior performance (Venkatraman and Camillus 
1984). This insight is gained from Chandler’s (1962) seminal work on the fit between strategy, 
structure, and the performance implications of this fit. Pursuing different strategies in FDI, 
such as in the case of market expansion vs. resource seeking, requires a different set of 
resources and level of control (Brouthers et al. 2008). The literature does not provide a 
definite answer on the performance implication of JVs or WOSs. Some argue that WOSs 
outperform JVs in both ex ante and ex post manners (Brouthers et al. 2003; Chang et al. 2013; 
Shaver 1998). Others reveal greater complexity. For instance, Xu et al. (2006a) find that, in 
China JVs outperformed WOSs in terms of ROA. This divergence in empirical work implies 
that FDI operational ownership may work with other internal and external factors (e.g., FDI 
mandate and experience) in influencing performance. WOSs are different from JVs in 
dimensions of control, operating flexibility, and rent-sharing structure, all of which are 
important for market expansion and for avoiding conflicts with local partners (Peng 2003). 
China’s emerging-market nature implies the imperative importance for MNEs to learn and 
understand the marketplaces (i.e., consumers, the distribution system, and local competitors, 
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etc.). Market-seeking MNEs with more local preference are firmly embedded in local 
supplier and customer networks (Dunning 1998). Local experience contributes to the 
development of new knowledge and absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; 
Petersen et al. 2008; Zahra and George 2002), which influences a subsidiary’s performance 
(Delios and Beamish 2001). Firms need time to learn and digest the changing institutional 
environment in order to respond effectively for compliance and legitimacy (Kostova and 
Zaheer 1999) and develop absorptive capacity (Petersen et al. 2008). Foreign entrants have to 
learn about the local environment and develop accordingly the know-how of market 
expansion from their own experience of interacting with local customers, suppliers and 
channel members (Tan and Meyer 2011). Moreover, experienced investors are more likely to 
evolve to establish and benefit from the fit between environment, strategy and structure 
(Venkatraman and Camillus 1984). 
Market seeking orientation and institutions 
A specific strategy does not readily lead to better performance, as past research has seen the 
impact of market seeking on FDI performance (Pan and Chi 1999). Superior performance 
will be contingent on how well the environment, structure and strategy are aligned (Olson et 
al. 2005).  
MNEs seeking local market opportunities tend to confront a greater level of influence from 
environmental forces than those seeking export sales (Luo 2001). The institutional theory and 
the strategic response theme claim that firms can be actively aware of the institutional 
pressures, such as regulative forces, and consciously intend to conform (Yiu and Makino 
2002). Sometimes they employ tactics to actively exert influence on the institutional 
constituents, based on the understanding that conformity will be self-serving to organizational 
interests (Oliver, 1993). The consistency of institutional change with organizational goals 
leads to organizations’ willingness to acquiesce to external pressures (Oliver, 1993). Many 
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MNEs seek market expansion in fast growing emerging markets to exploit the market 
potentials. In some cases, they may not be able to market their products locally, instead, they 
use local resources to make and assemble products for exporting due to the host country’s 
restriction on local sales.  
The institution change perspective suggests that institutions are not static but evolving to 
exert impact (Cantwell et al. 2010; North 1990; Peng 2003). This implies a dynamic strategic 
fit between institutions and firm strategy. Extending this line of thinking, we hypothesize the 
evolutionary impact of institutions on market-seeking and FDI performance link. China as a 
transitional economy provides a perfect platform for this study. China used to have strict 
requirements in terms of export proportion, local contents, and the balance of foreign 
exchanges of FDI. On its way for a market economy, China has been dismissing 
government-instituted distribution, wholesale, and retail systems under the central planning 
regime (Luo 1998). Meeting WTO requirements, China implemented a new trade and foreign 
investment policy from 2001 onwards with the objective to remove exporting mandates for 
foreign subsidiaries
2
. China further opened its domestic market to foreign investors by 
granting them trading and distribution rights in 2005
3
. The policy changes provide a friendlier 
institutional environment for market-seeking FDI, enabling MNEs to seek opportunities in 
the Chinese market by selling locally the products they manufacture. Many MNEs react 
rapidly by turning exports into local sales when these restrictions are lifted or relaxed. During 
China’s course towards a market economy and a full membership of WTO, many MNEs also 
worked actively to persuade Chinese government to open up more its domestic market (Child 
and Tse 2001; Ramamurti 2001). Foreign firms that can be proactively adaptive to the 
                                                             
2
 See Detailed Implementing Rules for the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned 
Enterprises (revised in 2001). 
3
 Since then foreign investors are allowed to set up new and standalone Foreign Invested Commercial 
Enterprises or expand the business scope of an existing subsidiary to domestic distribution and sales with their 
own distribution channels. See Measures for the Administration on Foreign Investment in Commercial Fields 
announced in 2004 and effective from 2005. 
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institutional change by developing strategies in emerging markets can enjoy better 
performance due to the increased legitimacy and higher efficiency in complying to the new 
institutional development (Peng 2003). Thus we have: 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between market seeking orientation and 
performance will be contingent on the host country’s formal institutions towards 
domestic sales; the relationship will be strengthened when the host country adopts 
favourable policy towards FDI’s access to domestic market. 
 
Experience 
Experience reflects a firm’s successes and failures over time. Experience in the host market 
serves as a critical factor that reduces the liability of foreignness and improves the 
understanding of the external environment and FDI operations (Luo 2001). It also relates to a 
firm’s capability to generate, disseminate, and exploit new knowledge, namely absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Petersen et al. 2008; Zahra and George 2002). The 
Uppsala model asserts that firms gain experience in international operations as a key 
mechanism to reduce uncertainty and then move along the internationalization stages (Elango 
and Pattnaik 2007; Johanson and Vahlne 1977). Host country experience provides important 
information about the business environment that enables a foreign firm to make better 
assessment of future expansions, and extends its understanding of alternatives (Delios and 
Henisz 2003), and is a key determinant of resource contributions, investment scale, 
knowledge commitment, and business localization (Luo 2001). 
The length of operation in the host reflects the level of experience that can impact the 
outcomes of the chosen strategy and the extent of success. Firms gain experience through 
environmental scanning, interaction with market forces, learning-by-doing, and internalizing  
past experience as organizational memory, which determines the development of its 
knowledge acquisition, assimilation, exploration capabilities (Zahra and George 2002). Firms 
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tend to rely on their business experience to run foreign operations, especially in such a 
dynamic market as China. Learning is more difficult in new fields (Petersen et al. 2008). It is 
of paramount importance for market-seeking MNEs to learn local markets, accumulate 
knowledge in marketing products locally, and gain access to local distribution system (Li 
1994; Vanhonacker 1997). Market-seeking firms have to face new competition and customers, 
as well as many other difficulties (Cuervo-Cazurra et al. 2007). They will face a severe 
shortage of understanding of the local marketplace, and key actors in areas such as marketing, 
sales and services if they do not have a long history of operations for the purpose of better 
satisfying actual and potential customers’ tastes and needs (Pan and Chi 1999). They will be 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis local rivals if not familiarizing themselves with the local language, 
business customs, legal requirements, and marketing procedures (Nachum and Zaheer 2005). 
Given China’s unique business environment, foreign firms face more challenges to adapt to 
this local marketplace. They need time to develop and apply local capacity, such as relational 
networks, namely guanxi, which are a strategic resources in doing business in China (Luo 
1997; Luo and Park 2001; Pan and Chi 1999; Peng 2003). London and Hart (2004) refer to 
this as an extra capability, social embeddedness, to allow MNEs to understand and leverage 
the strengths of the market environment. Strategically valuable as it is, guanxi networks take 
time to cultivate and develop, and the length of operation greatly increases the level of guanxi 
of a foreign firm (Luo & Park, 2001). In addition, although China is a unitary state with 
uniform laws across the country, the business environment varies across regions (Du et al. 
2008). Firms need time to acquire the experience and adjust their practice which can well 
reflect the sub-local needs.  
Based on these we have: 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between market seeking orientation and 
performance will be contingent on the firm’s local experience, such that a 
market-seeking firm that is more experienced will have better performance. 
15 
 
 
Ownership structure 
The strategic fit paradigm also advocates the fit between strategy and structure as a 
performance-enhancing mechanism (Venkatraman and Camillus 1984). The ownership 
structure is a critical component in terms of creating and heaping value from a strategy, with 
important performance implications for foreign subsidiaries (Brouthers and Hennart 2007). 
To generate and garner value from market seeking, foreign firms with strong absorptive 
capacity through accumulated operational experience will act in a fit-enhancing manner. 
Particularly, they will adopt ownership structure that are more congruent with their 
market-seeking orientations with a focus on the market dynamics and flexibility, curtailing 
conflicts with local partners, protecting valuable assets, and ensuring a full control. 
FDI is usually organized into two structures: WOSs and JVs (Brouthers and Hennart 2007), a 
choice critical to FDI operation. Which one prevails depends not only on the need to maintain 
control, but also on its performance outcomes (Chang et al. 2013). We suggest a three-way 
interaction such that a wholly-owned structure may make market expansion better off, 
contingent on the MNE’s experience in the host country.  
JVs and WOSs work in different directions for benefits (Brouthers and Hennart 2007). JV is a 
way to pool and use valuable resources with local partners, especially when the resources 
cannot be obtained efficiently via market exchanges or mergers and acquisitions (Das and 
Teng 2000; Xu et al. 2006a), such as insightful information and country-specific knowledge 
(Luo 1997; 1998); It creates learning from partners (Ireland et al. 2002), and thus lower the 
risk of institutional conflicts between a foreign subsidiary and host-country institutions (Xu et 
al. 2006a).  
However, close and long-term partnership is difficult to establish and maintain in JVs (Chang 
et al. 2013). Several reasons make the value of JVs difficult for market seekers to reap in 
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China, i.e. diversion of partners’ orientation for cooperation (e.g., Chinese partners prefer 
quick profit from partnering while the MNE treats it as a platform for strategic entry and 
learning even at short-term loss) (Vanhonacker 1997); difficulty in coordinating a parent-JV 
product portfolio due to shared control, divergent learning and frustrated expectations created 
by task definitions, partners’ routines, and expectations (Chang et al. 2013); and JV instability 
prompted by ownership and management control imbalance between parents (Steensma and 
Lyles 2000). Additionally, differences in institutional norms among partners may make 
information that is important to the focal firm ignored by a partner, simply because it falls 
outside accepted bounds (He et al. 2013; Xu et al. 2006a). Institutional distance can also 
create significant barriers that make the inter-partner communication of market information 
difficult or inaccurate (He et al. 2013; Kostova and Zaheer 1999). Furthermore, with the 
removal of many protectionist regulations, the value of local partnership is hugely reduced 
(Child and Tse 2001; Pan and Chi 1999). Thus to create more value and reduce costs the 
market seeking MNEs are less likely to use JVs for local market knowledge and entry.  
In contrast, WOS not only helps market seekers reduce the fictions with local partners but 
also keeps the generated rent solely directed to the firm. From a transaction cost perspective, 
the wholly owned mode is ideal when the invested are intangible assets, and when potential 
partners may act opportunistically (Chang et al. 2013; Vanhonacker 1997), because it works 
as a way to protect these assets from expropriation (Chan et al. 2008). This is truly the case in 
China as MNEs tend to bring their advanced technology to China as evidenced by the fact 
that many Western and Japanese firms have set up R&D centers in China in sectors such as 
personal computers, telecommunications, chemical, automotive, pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology (Asakawa and Som 2008).  
From the management control perspective, WOS offers market seekers full control from 
inception to demise by establishing their own control mechanisms, corporate culture and 
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management systems. As a result MNEs will be more likely to extend their proprietary assets 
to their WOSs and accordingly launch the latest products in the local market, which are often 
the most profitable products (Pan and Chi 1999). Besides, subsidiaries will have more 
decision-marking power and flexibility as opposed to the requirement to obtain consent from 
local partners in JVs in order to respond to local markets more swiftly; this is critical when 
pursuing market expansion (Chang et al. 2013; Luo 2001). Sole ownership also protects 
subsidiaries from clashes in managerial styles and interests that often occur in JVs 
(Vanhonacker 1997). China is undergoing rapid change in consumers’ appetites and 
competition, which requires quick decision making and implementation. Essentially, 
therefore, the wholly owned option can be attractive to MNEs that seek to explore market 
opportunities here.  
Emerging markets are characterized by “institutional voids” caused by underdeveloped factor 
markets including capital, product and labor (Chan et al. 2008), the lack of reliable market 
information and efficient intermediary institutions, and excessive government intervention 
(Makino et al. 2004). Many resources that firms need for growth and development are strictly 
controlled by the state and are not always available for market exchange. For example, the 
stock market and bond market where the financial resources are channeled are restricted from 
foreign investors. In order to gain access to these valuable resources, foreign investors will 
need local resourceful partners. Nevertheless, in China, the post-WTO era is attributed by a 
much opener policy towards FDI on local sales. The market structure has become much more 
transparent for most commodities, and MNEs have access to the market equally with their 
indigenous rivals (Ralston et al. 2006). In addition, many Chinese partners are incapable of 
providing market access and finding markets (Vanhonacker 1997). Thus, local partners in 
market seeking are therefore less important than seeking other valuable resources (Nachum 
and Zaheer 2005).  
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Based on these, we have: 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between market seeking orientation and 
performance will be contingent on the subsidiary’s ownership structure, such that a 
market-seeking firm that uses wholly owned structure will have better 
performance. 
 
MNEs need FDI experience to improve their capability in managing WOSs (Chan et al. 2008) 
and their market entry and penetration. The institutions and the market in China have 
experienced substantial and fast change for long periods (Peng 2003). Less experienced 
entrants with wholly owned investments confront a high level of outsidership in the local 
market (Tan and Meyer 2011). MNEs operating in this market need a significant amount of 
knowledge and skills to enable them to play solo and be better aligned with the changing 
institutional framework, distribution channel relationships, customer demands and consumer 
appetite (Child and Tse 2001). Many drawbacks of wholly owned structure, such as the 
liability of foreignness, a high degree of uncertainty, lacking capabilities of doing business 
locally, can be addressed when a subsidiary becomes experienced in the host country (Gao 
and Pan 2010). More management control and internalized rent in a wholly owned 
market-seeking subsidiary should contribute to performance when more experience has been 
accumulated. Thus, we have: 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between a wholly-owned subsidiary’s market 
seeking orientation and performance will be contingent on it experience, such that it 
will have better performance when it becomes more locally experienced. 
 
3. Methods 
Data 
Our empirical context of market-seeking strategy followers in China covering a period of 
2003-2010 provides an ideal laboratory to answer our research questions. One of the largest 
FDI recipients, China, along with many emerging-market counterparts, works as a 
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manufacturing platform for worldwide marketplaces, providing low-cost raw and produced 
materials and working forces to MNEs. These nations are also important markets 
characterized with rapidly and continuously expanding appetite for both consumer and 
industrial products/services where MNEs busily satisfy through market-seeking FDI 
(Dunning 2000; 2009). China has also been undergoing significant institutional transition 
from a centrally controlled economy to market economy. After 2001, it significantly relaxed 
the restriction on foreign investors’ domestic sales as part of the requirements for the WTO 
membership to adopt much freer orientation towards FDI (Chang et al. 2013).  
We use both industry-level and firm-level data. Our industry-level data were gathered from 
the Emerging Markets Information Service (EMIS) database of CEIC Data Company Ltd, 
and the subsequent volumes of China Statistical Yearbook. Firm-level data were obtained 
from a database of the local authority of Jiangsu Province. The data are from annual survey of 
greenfield FDI conducted by the local government. It provided the management information 
of all enterprises registered in this province. The samples were selected based on four 
criterions: 1) they are foreign invested firms which are active in generating revenues; 2) they 
remained active in 2010; 3) they were established before 2007; and 4) they are in 
manufacture industries. Notably, after dropping samples with incomplete information, we 
were left with 5,080 firms. The longitudinal data of these firms during 2003-2010 were used 
in our estimation
4
. Jiangsu was selected as our data source for three reasons. First, a recipient 
of approximately a quarter of the total FDI into China, Jiangsu is the most important 
destination for FDI nationwide (MOC 2011). Second, the FDI information of this province 
has been well documented by the local authority, thus ensuring quality of the data. Third, by 
focusing on a single province we are able to effectively control for regional effect, given the 
                                                             
4 In addition to the firms that were established before 2003, firms that were registered during 2003-2007 are also included in 
the sample. Therefor the estimations use unbalanced panel data. 
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size of China and the heterogeneity of provinces (Pedroni and Yao 2006).  
Dependent Variable 
We use return on assets (ROA), the most common measure of profitability, to measure firm 
performance (Hitt et al. 1997), which is the ratio of after-tax profit to total asset. 
Key independent variables  
We include a set of independent variables in line with our hypotheses. First, market-seeking 
orientation (Market) of a specific firm in a specific year is measured by the share of domestic 
sale in total sales of the firm (Estrin et al. 2009; Pan and Chi 1999; Song 2002).  
WOS (wholly owned subsidiaries) refers to those foreign firms whose registered capital is 
100% contributed by foreign investor(s); JV (joint ventures) refers to foreign firms whose 
25-99% of the registered capital is contributed by foreign investor(s). In line with Chinese 
FDI law and conventional statistics, we define foreign investors as those who are from 
outside of mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan. The literature has noted that 
there are significant differences between investors from western countries and those from 
Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan (HMT) in terms of behaviors, strategy and performance 
(Anwar and Sun 2012; Wang et al. 2009; Zhang 2005). HMT are ethnically Chinese 
economies, the investment from which is not viewed as “truly foreign” in nature (Du et al. 
2008). In addition, a large proportion of the investment from HMT is the Round-Tripping 
investment originated from mainland China for tax and other reasons, which is not true 
foreign investment (Xiao 2004). Therefore, we single out HTM investment as a separate type 
of ownership in contract to WOS and JV, and keep our focus on the ownership structure of 
non-HTM investment. WOS is devised as a dummy variable with the value of 1 if the firm is 
a wholly-owned subsidiary, and 0 otherwise; JV is a dummy variable with the value of 1 if 
the firm is a JV, and 0 otherwise.  
Subsidiary experience (Age) is measured by the number of years since the subsidiary’s 
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establishment
5
 (Delios and Beamish 2001). We developed a variable Policy to capture the 
host’s institutions towards market seeking. The year of 2005 is chosen as the cutoff as the 
national policy towards FDI that lifted restrictions to foreign firms’ conducting domestic sales 
and distribution became effective from 2005. Policy is gauged by a dummy variable (1 if the 
time was 2005 or onwards, and 0 otherwise). 
Control variables 
Firm-level control variable 
We included several factors that may impact MNEs’ performance. Firm size (Size) is 
measured by the value of total assets (RMB in billion) (Dhawan 2001).  
Corporation tax (Taxation) is captured by tax rate of a firm applies. In order to attract FDI 
into China, various tax incentives were available to foreign invested firms since the 1980s, 
which included tax holiday and tax reductions for these firms in special areas or sectors. Tax 
holiday were also provided for start-up business. From 2008, the new Enterprise Income Tax 
Law of China became effective, under which the reduced tax rates for foreign invested firms 
would gradually increase to the standardized rate (25%) within five years after the new law's 
implementation. The tax rate would raise the cost and negatively impact profitability (Grubert 
and Mutti 1991). 
The salary cost of a firm (Salary) is gauged by ratio of salary cost to value of management 
cost. Firms may tend to take cost-leadership strategy using China’s abundant labor reserve, 
while a high salary cost may reduce profitability (Li 2003).  
Fixed assets, measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets value, represents fixed assets 
ratio as a proxy of capital intensity of a firm. A capital-intensive firm has to carry a relatively 
large asset base, which makes the adjustment cost very high. Prior research shows a negative 
                                                             
5 We only take the firms that are active with selling into account. The firms that were established in China but are not active 
or selling are not included in our dataset. 
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relationship between capital intensity and profitability (Ramasamy et al. 2005). 
The public relation cost (PR cost) is operationalized as the ratio of public relation cost to total 
management cost. Developing and maintaining close relationships, or guanxi, is costly and 
results in high PR cost for doing business in China (e.g., Lee 2010). 
Industrial level control variables 
We also include following industrial variables to control for industrial attributes that may 
induce performance variance (Luo 1998; Meyer 1998). 
Capital intensity of an industry (Capital intensity) is measured by the value of total fixed 
asset (RMB in ten thousand) divided by the number of employees (Blomstrom and Persson 
1983). FDI ratio of an industry (FDI ratio) is measured by the ratio of value of foreign capital 
to total capital of the industry. The growth rate of an industry (Growth rate) is measured by 
the ratio of one year's revenue to previous year's revenue. Technology intensity of an industry 
(Tech intensity) is measured by the ratio of R&D expenditure to total revenue. Crisis 
represents the period of financial crisis, devised as a dummy variable with the value of 1 if it 
is in the year 2008 and onwards, and 0 otherwise. 
In addition, we include two dummy variables to control for the effect of home countries: 
HTM (1 if the investor is from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau, and 0 otherwise), and EUUS 
(1 if an investor is from the EU or the US, and 0 otherwise).  
Estimations 
Endogeneity is well recognized as an important issue in strategic management research 
(Brouthers et al. 2003; Chang et al. 2013; Hamilton and Nickerson 2003; Shaver 1998). A 
firm’s choice of strategy is nonrandom, or self-selected, so as that strategic choice may be 
dependent partially on other organizational and/or industrial attributes that are difficult to 
measure and cannot be included in the model; ignoring endogeneity can lead to biased 
parameter estimations (Hult et al. 2008).  
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Market seeking can be an endogenous decision attributed to industrial and firm characteristics 
(Hult et al. 2008; Shaver 1998). In order to control for the potential endogeneity problem, a 
two-step approach was adopted (Brouthers et al. 2003; Hult et al. 2008; Shaver 1998). In the 
first step, an unobserved self-selection correction variable, or inverse Millers ratio, was 
calculated from the estimated parameters of market-seeking equation using Probit regression 
with independent variables including local market sales percentage, sales growth in local 
market, FDI experience, firm size, percentage of FDI in trade and distribution functions, 
export ratio, and FDI origins (EU, USA, and HMT), etc. In the second step, the parameters of 
the performance equation were estimated by adding the correction variable. The random 
effect model is used in the both steps. 
In an effort to assess the effect and significance of moderating variable, the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction terms is not sufficient to judge the moderating effect. The 
coefficient’ variance and covariance of the corresponding variable and interaction terms, as 
well as the value of moderating variable should all be taken into account (Zhang et al. 2011). 
The approach used was introduced by Fredrich (1982) and Brambor et al. (2006) to assess the 
effect and significance of moderating variable. Two-way and three-way interactions are 
estimated in order to test the hypotheses. 
 
4. Results  
First we calculated the correlations between all independent variables. All VIF values are far 
below 5, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue in all models below
6
. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
To calculate the unobserved self-selection correction variable and to test our hypotheses, we 
                                                             
6 All the independent variables are included in the calculation, which apply to Models 3-10. The sample size of Models 3-10 
is 26,775 due to missing data of variable Market. We also calculated correlations with full sample (37,340) but without this 
variable, which apply to Model 1-2. No evidence for multicollinearity was found. These results are available upon request. 
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applied random effect estimation by using panel data of 5,080 firms during 2003-2010. In 
Table 3 which presents the estimates of performance equation, Model 1 and 2 use the full 
sample of 37,304 observations. Model 1 includes a constant and control variables; Model 2 
further includes three moderating variables (WOS, Age and Policy). Based on Model 1 and 2, 
we added Market into Models 3, and Market and the self-correction term into Model 4. In 
Model 5-8, we added four two-way interaction items (Market _WOS, Market _JV, Market 
_Age, Market _Policy) respectively. In Model 9-10, two three-way interaction items 
(Market_Age _WOS, Market_Age _JV) and relevant two-way interaction items were added 
separately. Based on the estimates of Model 5-10, we calculate the moderating effects and 
their significance.  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
We see significant increase in explanatory power as we include more explaining variables. 
The model s1-4 without interaction terms can be used to explain the direct effects of 
explanatory variables. Models 5-10, which include interaction terms, are used to calculate the 
moderating effect. The results of moderating effect are shown in figure 1-6.  
Model 3-4 all indicate that Market has significantly positive impact on ROA; AGE is 
positively and significantly related to ROA. Policy is positively associated to ROA but only 
significant in Model 2.  
The results of the moderating effects are presented in Figure 1-6. The two-way interaction 
effects in Figure 1 and 2 indicate that (1) Policy has significantly positive effect on the 
Market-performance link, supporting H1, and (2) Age has positive moderating effect on the 
Market-performance link: especially when Age is over six years, the moderate effect becomes 
significant, providing support to H2.  
The two-way interaction effects in Figure 3 and 4 indicate that both WOS and JV have 
insignificant effects on Market-performance link, inconsistent with H3. This result implies 
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that joint ownership or whole ownership along may not be sufficient for successful market 
expansion; there may be other contingencies that necessitate the market-seeking operations.  
The three-way interaction effect in Figure 5 shows that Market*Age *WOS is significantly 
and positively linked to performance. This indicates that a fit among market seeking (Market), 
subsidiary experience (Age) and WOS structure increases performance, in support to H4. We 
also observe that the three-way interaction with JV, Market*Age*JV, is not significant 
(Figure 6), showing that joint structure does not fit with the market-seeking orientation 
(Market) and experience as WOS does.  
(Insert Figures 1-6 here) 
 
5. Discussions  
The key motivation of the study reported here was to explore the way in which market 
seeking MNEs can improve FDI performance in the context of China, based on the thinking 
of the strategic fit and institutional theory. Our analysis results show that (1) the host 
country’s institutional forces towards FDI significantly influence a market-seeking investor’s 
profitability; (2) FDI operational experience in the host country is a crucial factor for a 
market-seeking investor to have superior performance, as this helps it gain understanding of 
the dynamics in institutions, the marketplace and the distribution system, and thus achieve 
greater absorptive capacity and then better performance; and (3) more experienced investors 
enjoy even better performance when the investment is structured in a wholly owned manner.  
Our findings offer three substantive contributions. First, this research extends to consider the 
important role played by institutional forces in the host country, which past market seeking 
studies have not fully addressed. International firms’ strategy and performance are driven by 
these forces to a great extent (Peng et al., 2008). Enriching the institution-based view, our 
findings indicate that the outcome of MNEs’ market seeking orientation and strategy are 
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subject to the influence of host countries’ institutions; the alignment of the strategy and 
environment positively impacts performance.  
Second, this research reveals several conditions under which market-seeking investors can 
achieve better performance, an important but overlooked topic in the international business 
literature (Pan and Chi 1999). Using lenses of the strategic fit paradigm (Venkatraman 1989; 
Venkatraman and Camillus 1984) and the institutional thinking (North 1990; Oliver 1991; 
Peng et al. 2008; Venkatraman and Prescott 1990), we extend the line of research by 
revealing that to achieve higher profitability, foreign firms pursuing market expansion in 
China should systematically consider the institutional framework towards FDI, their 
experience and knowledge of China’s institutional environment and market place, and the 
compatibility of FDI operation ownership with market seeking. Our results from longitudinal 
data analysis support this combination and specify the importance of matching FDI strategic 
orientation, operational structure and institutional constrains to enhance FDI performance. 
We also add to the market entry literature by suggesting a clear condition under which FDI 
ownership structure moderates the strategy-performance link. FDI ownership research has 
been unclear in regard to the performance implications of WOSs and JVs (Brouthers et al. 
2003; Xu et al. 2006a). Our study specifies that a wholly owned structure matches market 
seeking better with its capacity of preventing the operations from conflicts with local partners 
(Chang et al. 2013), protecting valuable assets (Chan et al. 2008), and fully controlling the 
business (Pan and Chi 1999), only when the subsidiary is more experienced. Our study 
therefore extends the knowledge on the way in which FDI performance can be improved by 
matching the governance mode with FDI orientation. 
Third, this research also adds to the institution change perspective (North 1990; Peng 2003) 
by investigating the dynamic impact of institutions on the association of market-seeking 
orientation and FDI performance, with the aid of a novel and sizeable longitudinal data set. 
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The institutions are not static exerting changing impact on businesses, people and 
governments, and the way how these interact. International organizations’ strategies and 
performance will be accordingly driven by evolving institutions (Peng et al. 2008). Our study 
provides support to this perspective; the host country’s formal institutions, especially FDI 
policy, dynamically affect market seekers’ FDI outcome. 
Our study provides important guidelines and practical implications for business managers. 
First, as China has been establishing more favorable institutions encouraging FDI in general 
and opening up its markets in multiple sectors, MNEs have found market seeking an 
attractive strategy not only for larger sales volumes but also profitability. MNEs have easier 
access not only to manufacturing facilities, but also to the fast-developing Chinese market, 
which can provide a source for further growth. Market expansion becomes even more 
attractive when the labor cost has been increasing and the economic model has been changing 
from a dependence on export-led growth to consumption-led growth in recent years in China. 
Consequently, export orientation becomes less attractive.  
Second, China remains a transitional economy, which is characterized by a high level of 
market dynamics, developing market-support systems as well as institutional voids. In order 
to make market seeking successful, MNEs have to be patient in terms of cumulating 
knowledge of Chinese institutions, marketplace, and distribution system, etc. As this study 
reveals, it may need at least six-year operational experience in China before it can garner 
value from market seeking.  
Third, an experienced MNE can benefit even more when it structures the FDI under wholly 
ownership to protect intellectual rights, guarantee complete control over FDI operations, and 
prompt reaction to market. The drawbacks of WOS can be offset by accumulating experience 
and developed knowledge of local institutions, dynamics of market, and establishing 
connections with key actors, such as government officials and business partners (Peng 2003). 
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Our study has several limitations that offer significant opportunities for future research. First, 
we did not consider the use of a combination of WOS and JV, and the possible transformation 
of JV into WOS as highlighted by researchers (Chang et al. 2013; Vanhonacker 1997). The 
decision between a WOS and a JV is not necessarily an “either/or” choice. A local partner 
may have a powerful distribution network or may operate in a protected section, which is 
attractive to MNEs (Vanhonacker 1997). In such cases, a foreign firm can be involved in 
production by a WOS, and marketing and sales with a JV. Another strategy is the conversion 
of JVs into WOSs when the value-adding of local partners is significant but confined to the 
early life cycle of the JV (Chang et al. 2013; Vanhonacker 1997). Future research can 
investigate the interaction between these more complex configurations and FDI motivation. 
Second, the nature of secondary data has constrained us from more explicitly using 
absorptive capacity as a tool to explore this capability’s impact on marketing seeking firms’ 
performance. Absorptive capacity, consisting of four complementary acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation and exploitation capabilities, leads to competitive advantage (Zahra and 
George 2002). Foreign subsidiaries need this capacity to achieve business success in the host 
country (Petersen et al. 2008). In addition, only the number of years since the subsidiary’s 
establishment was taken as a measure of FDI experience, which may overlook the subtle 
difference between different types of experience, namely contractual arrangement experience, 
equity joint venture experience, and wholly owned subsidiary experience, for example (Gao 
and Pan 2010).  
Third, this study operationalized FDI performance as profitability, an important aspect of 
performance. Performance is a key dependent variable of business research, the assessment of 
which remains a difficult issue. Scholars have called for the use of a measurement that can 
reflect its multidimensional and multilevel nature (Hult et al. 2008). In the international 
business field, researchers use different types of performance measurement, including 
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financial, operational and overall effectiveness (Hult et al. 2008). Therefore future research 
may extend this study to investigate the hypothesized relationships on other performance 
measures in order to establish a complete understanding of these impacts on FDI 
performance. 
Finally, our sample only included manufacturing investment established via greenfield mode. 
Thus further research could employ databases with richer information to compare the effects 
of investment in service versus in manufacturing sectors, the influence of manufacturing units 
versus service units, and the impact of greenfield mode versus acquisition mode
7
. 
                                                             
7
 We thank a reviewer for this interesting point. 
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Table 1 Summary of empirical market-seeking research 
Authors Theory Samples Methods Results Antecedents to FDI 
performance 
Luo (2001) The global 
integration-local 
responsiveness 
paradigm 
168 MNE subsidiaries 
in China 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
Market-seeking subsidiary’s local 
responsiveness is linked to 
environmental complexity (+), 
business practice specificity (+), 
cultural distance from the host 
country (-),competition intensity 
(+), market demand heterogeneity 
(+), government instituted 
component localization (+), local 
market orientation (+), export 
market orientation (-), previous 
experience, having established 
ties with managers at other 
businesses and with government 
officials,  
 
Luo and Park 
(2001)* 
Strategic fit 113 foreign ventures in 
China 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 Analyzer orientation 
(+) 
Zhao and Luo 
(2002) 
RBV, TCA 319 foreign subsidiaries 
(manufacturing) in 
China 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 Related diversification 
strategy (+), majority 
ownership (+), both of 
which interact to boost 
performance. 
Luo (2003)* resource 
dependence and 
dynamic 
capability 
196 MNE subsidiaries 
in China 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
 Parent firm’s control 
flexibility (+), 
resource commitment 
(+), and local 
responsiveness (+), 
moderated by 
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regulatory interference 
(-), by industrial 
opportunity (+). 
Chen, Griffith 
& Hu (2006) 
Liability of 
foreignness 
3,085 Sino-foreign 
manufacturing ventures  
Archived 
database 
(Almanac of 
China’s Foreign 
Economic 
Relations and 
Trade, 
1979-1992) 
MNEs from higher LOF countries 
are more likely to employ 
market-seeking 
strategies 
 
Gil et al. 
(2006) 
 247 Dutch, Greek, 
German, and US firms 
Cross-sectional 
survey 
Market-seeking firms use less 
joint ventures for new venture 
formation  
 
Brouthers, 
Gao & 
McNicol 
(2008) 
 54 countries (country as 
analysis unit) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
Database 
(UNCTAD, 
2004). 
Market attractiveness mitigates 
negative impact of corruption on 
market-seeking FDI. 
 
Hansen, 
Pedersen & 
Petersen 
(2009) 
 95 Danish FDIs Cross-sectional 
survey 
FDI of market-seeking MNCs 
create more jobs among local 
linkage partners, but imply less 
job upgrading. 
 
* Market-seeking orientation and FDI performance research.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 Mean Std. 
Err. 
Market WOS JV AGE Policy Size Taxation Salary Fixed 
assets 
PR cost Capital 
intensity 
FDI ratio Growth 
rate 
Tech 
intensity 
Crisis HTM EUUS  
Market 0.4857  0.0023  1                 
WOS 0.4601  0.0030  -0.1071 1                
JV 0.1766 0.3813 0.0259 -0.4275 1               
AGE 6.9286  0.0238  0.0631 -0.0729 0.0558 1              
Policy 0.5883  0.0030  0.0652 0.0312 0.0008 0.3964 1             
Size 0.1409  0.0048  -0.0018 0.0350 0.0066 0.0515 0.0515 1            
Taxation 0.1334  0.0007  0.0040 -0.0647 0.0258 0.0362 -0.0370 -0.0284 1           
Salary 0.1590  0.0048  -0.0119 0.0142 -0.0101 -0.0137 -0.0087 -0.0194 0.0170 1          
Fixed assets 0.2897  0.0027  -0.0158 0.0641 -0.0316 -0.0033 -0.0005 0.0097 0.0096 0.0046 1         
PR cost 0.0589  0.0017  0.0153 -0.0348 0.0304 0.0121 -0.0015 -0.0091 -0.0024 -0.0080 -0.0231 1        
Capital intensity 9.6313  0.0370  0.1826 0.0118 -0.0384 0.1174 0.2315 0.1225 -0.0213 -0.0325 -0.0010 0.0416 1       
FDI ratio 0.4193  0.0009  -0.2238 0.1342 -0.0954 -0.0614 0.0641 0.0152 -0.0348 0.0002 -0.0038 -0.0393 -0.3090 1      
Growth rate 0.2610  0.0005  0.0179 -0.0228 -0.0153 -0.1937 -0.3491 -0.0281 0.0675 0.0029 -0.0257 0.0039 0.0080 -0.2687 1     
Tech intensity 0.0086  0.0000  0.0375 0.1100 -0.0805 -0.0351 0.0807 0.0520 -0.0154 0.0015 -0.0218 -0.0268 0.2475 0.0308 0.1375 1    
Crisis 0.2732  0.0027  0.1475 0.0604 -0.0013 0.3767 0.5129 0.0560 -0.1154 -0.0045 0.0010 -0.0177 0.2854 -0.0236 -0.4286 0.0648 1   
HTM 0.3633  0.0029  0.0905 -0.6973 -0.3498 0.0314 -0.0330 -0.0415 0.0466 -0.0067 -0.0414 0.0120 0.0182 -0.0634 0.0357 -0.0501 -0.0616 1  
EUUS 0.1709  0.0023  0.0265 0.1562 0.2284 -0.0148 0.0044 -0.0019 -0.0007 -0.0034 -0.0167 0.0001 0.0132 -0.0751 0.0341 0.0565 0.0049 -0.3429 1 
Note: n = 26,775 
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Table 3 Random effect estimates of the performance equation  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Market   0.00610** 0.00606** 0.00751** 0.00557* -0.0009  0.0053  0.0091  0.0017  
   (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0052) (0.0038) (0.0072) (0.0058) 
WOS  -0.0101*** -0.0132*** -0.0133*** -0.0117**  -0.0133*** -0.0133*** -0.0247***  
  (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0050)  (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0074)  
JV      0.0119**    0.0423*** 
      (0.0056)    (0.0093) 
AGE  0.000731** 0.000796** 0.000871** 0.000883** 0.000875** 0.0004  0.000874** -0.0005  0.00128** 
  (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Policy  0.00307* 0.0032  0.0024  0.0024  0.0024  0.0025  0.0018  0.0022  0.0023  
  (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Size 0.00246** 0.00237** 0.0015  0.0015  0.0015  0.0015  0.0015  0.0015  0.0014  0.0015  
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Taxation -0.110*** -0.111*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.167*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) 
Salary -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** -0.0109*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Fixed assets -0.0124*** -0.0122*** -0.00900*** -0.00901*** -0.00902*** -0.00902*** -0.00896*** -0.00900*** -0.00897*** -0.00896*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
PR cost 0.00621** 0.00600** 0.00550* 0.00551* 0.00550* 0.00550* 0.00555* 0.00552* 0.00539* 0.00548* 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Capital intensity 0.00159*** 0.00148*** 0.00150*** 0.00147*** 0.00147*** 0.00147*** 0.00143*** 0.00146*** 0.00145*** 0.00145*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
FDI ratio 0.0312*** 0.0301*** 0.0338*** 0.0416*** 0.0415*** 0.0415*** 0.0414*** 0.0415*** 0.0446*** 0.0437*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0096) (0.0105) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0158) 
Growth rate 0.0165* 0.0200** 0.0252** 0.0240** 0.0240** 0.0240** 0.0236** 0.0239** 0.0260** 0.0258** 
 (0.0085) (0.0086) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
Tech intensity 2.089*** 2.081*** 2.295*** 2.292*** 2.290*** 2.290*** 2.284*** 2.295*** 2.230*** 2.250*** 
 (0.2500) (0.2520) (0.2930) (0.2930) (0.2930) (0.2930) (0.2930) (0.2930) (0.2930) (0.2940) 
Crisis -0.0282*** -0.0318*** -0.0271*** -0.0280*** -0.0281*** -0.0280*** -0.0282*** -0.0281*** -0.0298*** -0.0288*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
HTM -0.0034  -0.0112*** -0.0106** -0.0122** -0.0122** 0.0011  -0.0123** -0.0122** -0.0130** 0.0004  
 (0.0030) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0042) 
EUUS 0.0161*** 0.0146*** 0.0165*** 0.0158*** 0.0158*** 0.0157*** 0.0156*** 0.0157*** 0.0154*** 0.0152*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
lambda    -0.0382  -0.0391  -0.0383  -0.0386  -0.0383  -0.0432  -0.0438  
    (0.0576) (0.0576) (0.0576) (0.0576) (0.0576) (0.0576) (0.0576) 
Market _WOS    -0.0033     -0.0257**  
     (0.0056)    (0.0105)  
Market _JV     0.0027     -0.0143  
      (0.0072)    (0.0138) 
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Market _AGE      0.0010   0.0000  0.0005  
       (0.0007)  (0.0009) (0.0007) 
Market_Policy       0.0013    
        (0.0042)   
AGE_WOS         0.00203**  
         (0.0008)  
AGE_JV          -0.00439*** 
          (0.0011) 
Market_AGE _WOS        0.00298**  
         (0.00)  
Market_AGE _JV         0.0026  
          (0.0017) 
Constant 0.0077 0.0103  0.0121  0.0299  0.0297  0.0170  0.0340  0.0305  0.0403  0.0167  
 (0.0061) (0.0067) (0.0078) (0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0278) (0.0281) (0.0280) (0.0282) (0.0279) 
Observations 37304  37304  26775  26775 26775  26775  26775  26775  26775  26775  
Number of firms 5080 5080. 4880 4880  4880 4880  4880  4880 4880  4880  
chi-square test 882.60  904.40  898.30  898.70  899.00  898.80  901.20  898.90  946.90  923.70  
Note: a) Standard errors are shown in parentheses; 
     b) *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1 
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Figure 1 Moderating effect of Policy on the performance of market seeking 
orientation 
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Figure 2 Moderating effect of AGE on the performance of market seeking orientation 
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Figure 3 Moderating effect of WOS on the performance of market seeking orientation 
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Figure 4 Moderating effect of JV on the performance of market seeking orientation 
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Figure 5 Moderating effect of WOS on marginal effect of two way interaction: 
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Figure 6. Moderating effect of JV on marginal effect of two way interaction: 
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